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"[l]deas awaken one another, and they awaken
one another because they have always been
connected" - Diderot, The Dream of
D'Alembert
A great deal of anthropological practice revolves
around the comparison of human similarities and
differences. The predominance of comparisons in
anthropology, particularly in archaeology and
physical anthropology, places analogy at the
forefront of anthropological theory and practice
(Stepan 1990). My attention was drawn to this
topic because the use of analogy is rarely
discussed at either undergraduate or graduate
levels, yet its importance to the theory and
practice of anthropology is integral. Still, there
are some in academia who reject this and regard
analogy as subjective, poetic, un-scientific, and
ultimately nothing with which they should be
concerned. My goal in this paper is to
demonstrate that analogy, theory, and practice are
intimately linked and that all anthropologists
should be careful and reflect on how they
construct and use analogies. In many instances
the effects of false analogies are not benign and
can have serious social, political, and academic
repercussions.
Introduction
On a basic level, analogy is the relationship
between two things which are similar in many,
though not all respects. In logic, analogy
assumes that if two things are similar in one or
more respects, they will be similar in other
respects. In anthropology, we often construct and
create categories or classifications that are then
compared to arrive at what are hopefully some
new and useful inferences (Durrenberger and
Morrison 1977). For instance, archaeologists
have used ethnographic accounts of the symbolic
meaning of secondary burials to better
understand similar behaviours in past cultures
(Weiss-Krejci 2001; Kuijt 1996; Parker-Pearson,
1999). The debates that arise within
anthropology and other disciplines about analogy
are centred on a principal question: How do we,
or can we, make justifiable arguments based on
analogy? Branching off from this primary
concern are questions of method and theory:
How do we use analogy? How are similarities
and differences chosen? When using analogy to
explore relationships across large expanses of
time, how much does the present inform us about
the past, and vice versa? These elemental
questions have led me to ask the following: Can
we use the present as an analogical, and thus
theoretical, tool to understand the past? How
does the use of analogy create contingent
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representations and what effect does it have on
how anthropologists defme
civilizations/cultures? What is the relationship
between analogy, theory, and practice? Is
analogy inescapable? What are the benefits and
what are the pitfalls of analogical reasoning?
I will argue that justifiable arguments
from analogy are attainable, and that they can
provide useful insight into understanding the
past. However, I think that a proper use of
analogy is demanding because at a practical and
theoretical level, it is intimately tied to, and
influenced by, social metaphors and narratives.
Consequently, reflexivity is necessary to limit
the influence of these biases. Furthermore,
analogies often suffer from several structural or
logical problems independent of cultural or
political bias. These must be acknowledged and
dealt with as well. In my paper, I've chosen to
illustrate these difficulties through the use of a
number of short case studies. I will begin by first
elaborating on my defmition of analogy. I will
then explore what makes a good analogy, how
analogy relates to anthropological theory, and
what analogy can be used for. Following these
introductory arguments I will present a number
of case studies that exemplify some of the
problems in the use of analogy. The subsequent
sections will cover the relationship between
analogy, theory, metaphor, and how analogies
are created. The fmal section will reveal some
proper uses of analogy in anthropology.
What is Analogy?
As I mentioned earlier, analogy establishes a
relationship between two things that are distinct,
yet similar in many respects. In anthropology,
and in other fields, this basic idea or concept of
analogy should not be used to formulate
analogical arguments. To do so would be to
reduce analogy to a form of simile. Strong
analogical arguments in anthropology
incorporate and establish a relationship of
"partial similarity that involves a consideration
of differences as well" (Wylie 2002:147, italics
mine). The emphasis on differences is essential
to constructing valid analogical arguments; to
neglect differences is to create a false or simple
analogy, which is a logical fallacy (Wylie 2002).
The realm of simile with its strict adherence to
similarity (McGavin, 1989) is thus inadequate if
we are to draw out useful inferences from
analogy. As metaphors incorporate both
similarity and dissimilarity (McGavin, 1989),
they are perhaps a more useful hermeneutic tool.
I will discuss the relationship between analogy
and metaphor in greater detail in a number of
subsequent sections.
Closely related to the proper
consideration of similarities and differences is
the issue of relevance. Full causal relationships
are not necessary, but the an~logs must share
"determining structures" for relevance
(Weitzenfeld 1984, 143; cited in Wylie 2002).
This is akin to the problem of homology vs.
analogy in biology.
In addition to a full consideration of
similarities, differences, and relevance, a good
analogy will have modest conclusions relative to
the number and strength of the premises (Wylie
2002). This avoids problems of amplification;
that conclusions can claim relationships that are
not supported or are overextended beyond the
foundation of established premises of similarity.
Thus, the number and strength of inferred
similarities must be greater than the conclusions
drawn. For instance, arguments such as social
Darwinism "so far overreach what the premises
establish with respect to the similarities between
sources and subjects that they exemplify [the]
fallacy of simplistic analogy" (Wylie 2002,151).
Analogy in Anthropology
Many academics consider analogy as part of, or
embedded in, theory and subsequently in practice
(Gould 1989; Wylie 2002; Rorty 1991; Stepan
1990). In anthropology, and particularly in
archaeology and physical anthropology, theory is
often used by "extending an established theory to
new domains" (Wylie 2002, 148). Hence,
theoretical inferences are always analogical: "the
connections between material and behavioural or
other variables - the determining structures or
relations of structural and functional
interdependence - are just what archaeologists
cannot observe directly" (Wylie 2002, 148). We
cannot observe events or things as they happened
on their own terms in the past, so we rely on
analogy and what we know about the present to
compensate for this impediment.
There are a variety of structural forms
of analogy, but many in anthropology take the
form of the four-place analogy (Durrenberger
and Morrison 1977). Four-place analogies are
also variable, but some common forms are:
A:B::C:D, A:B::B:C, and A:B::C:B
(Durrenberger and Morrison 1977). Four-place
analogies are read as follows: A relates to B as C
relates to B, or ArB=CrB. The A and B grouping
is called the subject-side relationship or context,
while the C and B group is the source-side
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Man the Hunter and Physics for Apes
I've chosen to emphasize chimpanzee analogies
in this section because they are commonly
(mis)used in physical anthropology. My fIrst
case example is Sussman's (1999) article "The
Myth of Man the Hunter/Man the Killer and the
Evolution of Human Morality", in which he
challenges the assumption that chimpanzee
behaviour can be used as a model for early
hominid behaviour. Wrangham (1995, cited in
Sussman 1999) argues that because chimpanzees
and hominids underwent different evolutionary
paths only six to eight million years ago, and
since early hominids were somewhat
chimpanzee-like morphologically, the earliest
australopithecine must have been chimpanzee-
like in behaviour. Consequently, the shared
behavioural traits must be biologically inherited
and rooted in a common evolutionary past
(Wrangham, 1995, cited in Sussman 1999).
Wrangham and Peterson (1996, 24, cited in
Sussman, 1999) then argue that only
chimpanzees and humans display "intense, male-
initiated aggression, including lethal raiding into
neighbouring communities in search of
vulnerable enemies to attack and kill". This
argument implies both a predetermined violent
human moral nature (Sussman 1999), as well as
a potential biological excuse for human violence.
The relationship between chimpanzees
and hominids is a simple analogy at best; the
analogy fails to consider that the behavioural
differences among all living apes are significant
(Sussman 1999), thus placing serious doubt that
the analogy shares any determining structures.
Wrangham and Peterson's analogy also
fails because some of the basic information is
simply wrong. Chimpanzees are not rampant
killers (Sussman 1999). Thirty-seven years of
intense observation has yielded little supporting
evidence for Wrangham and Peterson's position
(Sussman, 1999). Although hunting and
occasional violence are not uncommon
chimpanzees have many social mechanisms a~
their disposal to avoid conflict. Additionally,
Sussman (1999) adds that chimpanzees have
been evolving as we have since our ancestral
split six to eight million years ago; to assume
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relationship. The four-place analogy A:B::C:B, is
common in archaeology as ethnographic
analogy. In this association, cultures A and Care
comparable because they share some similarity
B. Thus, inferences of meaning can be made for
some object or practice for a past culture if
similar objects or practices are found among
existing cultures. The following case studies
demonstrate some of the more fundamental
hazards to creating justified analogies.
Case Studies
"[W]e observe according to preset categories,
and often cannot "see" what stares us in the face"
(Gould, 1989: 128).
Stone Gorgets
This fIrst case study is a summary of a fme
example offered by Wylie (2002). Curren (1977,
cited in Wylie 2002) analyzed groundstone
gorgets and compared them to modem pottery-
making tools. He concluded that the stone
gorgets were used for pottery making on the
basis of shape and edge treatment. Specifically,
they had "thin with curved and beveled or
serrated edges and central perforations" which
are very similar to modem potter's tools (Wylie
2002, 149). The similarity was strong, but
Curren also accounted for a negative analogy, or
potential difference, that modem potters' tools
are not made of stone (Wylie 2002). Curren
(1977, cited in Wylie 2002) argues that this
difference is not signifIcant because modem
pottery tools are made with a wide variety of
materials. Subsequently, Curren (1977, cited in
Wylie 2002) concluded that material was not a
relevant difference and that the
morphology/function relationship still held.
Curren considered a wide variety of source-side
possibilities, made a strong case for similarities
as well as a consideration of differences, and
avoided any ampliative arguments. Yet, he
ultimately failed in his efforts to establish a good
analogy between stone gorgets and modem
potters' tools.
Curren depended too heavily on source-
side evidence for establishing the
appropriateness of looking at common features
and concluding similarity of function (Wylie
2002). Additionally, Curren failed to confmn
correlates in the subject-side context (Wylie
2002). In other words, Curren failed to uncover
that stone gorgets are frequently found in
preceramic contexts, thus greatly reducing any
validity his arguments had (Stama 1979, cited in
Wylie 2002). Curren's critical error was to not
test his analogy against available empirical
evidence. Wylie (2002) argues that tests for
relevance are crucial; archaeological (empirical)
evidence is needed to establish proper correlation
between subject (stone gorgets) and source-side
(modem pottery tools) contexts.
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behavioural continuity in chimpanzees is
simplistic.
The analogy fonnulated by Wrangham
and Peterson is tied into their beliefs about
human morality, male aggression and
'dominance', and the origin of hunting
(Sussman, 1999), as well as Christian beliefs
about sin (Landau, 1991). Their science was
deeply influenced by social metaphors. I am not
suggesting that there is a 'culture-free'
alternative that can be labeled as 'pure science';
science is a social exercise and notions of
objective purity are naiVe at best. My criticism
rests mainly on the fact that Wrangham and
Peterson failed to consider how their own biases
were influencing their fmdings, that some of
their basic data was wrong, and that they failed
to consider some important
behavioural/cognitive differences between
chimpanzees and humans.
It is with this emphasis on differences
that I wish to introduce another case study
focusing on chimpanzees. What Sussman
showed in the previous example was that
fonnulating a simplistic comparison between
humans and chimpanzees is specious reasoning.
Povinelli and Giambrone (2000) call this the
'argument by analogy'. The 'argument by
analogy' states that because chimpanzees and
humans often engage in outwardly similar
behaviours, and because we are similar in many
morphological ways, we can thus understand
chimpanzee behaviour by using human cognitive
models. Through this reasoning, the concept of
the chimpanzee 'theory of mind', or the ability to
recognize and "read" another's thoughts was
born (Povinelli and Giambrone, 2000). The most
common example provided by primatologists is
deceptive behaviour. In their book entitled "Folk
Physics for Apes", Povinelli and colleagues
question these basic assumptions and the
simplistic associations made by the 'argument by
analogy'.
Uncovering what the detennining
structures between human and chimpanzee
cognition actually are is crucial to physical
anthropology because chimpanzee analogical
models are regularly used, particularly in
paleoanthropology. Contingency of
representation is clearly at work since
'modernity' and the development of hominid
intelligence and culture are often assessed using
analogies based on chimpanzee tool use, social
behaviour and cognition. What Povinelli and
colleagues argue is that the chimpanzee/human
analogy has been passively accepted and that we
have not looked at chimpanzees and their
behaviour in their own tenns (Povinelli, 2000).
In short, we have humanized chimpanzees and
then used these skewed perceptions as analogical
models in recreating human evolution.
Povinelli and colleagues conducted an
impressive array of behavioural experiments to
test this received wisdom of primatology. In
short, they concluded that the theory of mind
does not hold (as it is currently defmed) for
chimpanzees (Povinelli, 2000). Chimpanzees do
not perceive the world as we do; their cognitive
abilities and processes, although complex, are
often very different from our own (Povinelli and
Giambrone, 2000). I will quickly illustrate one
the experiments that led to this conclusion.
The fIrst experiment conducted by
Povinelli and Giambrone (2000:20) was to test
the idea that chimpanzees can understand that
"others 'see'''. Appreciating that others see is to
recognize another's mind and thoughts, at least
in tenns of human cognition (Povinelli and
Giambrone, 2000). Moreover, it could be argued
that "most of our social interactions begin with a
detennination of the attentional state of our
communicative partners. [T]he appreciation that
we see (and hence experience) each other is the
glue that seems (to us, at least) to bind us to our
communicative partners" (Povinelli and
Giambrone, 2000: 20, emphasis in original).
Povinelli and Giambrone (2000: 22) tested this
through a number of 'gaze-following'
experiments that sought to deduce whether "the
ape simply understands the behavioural
confIgurations that lead to successful
interactions, or does it also mean that the animal
represents the caregiver as possessing
(unobserved) internal attentional states?" The
logic behind the tests was that if the chimpanzees
shared cognition similar to humans (as the
argument by analogy assumes), they would
behave similarly to human infants. The results
showed that chimpanzee behaviour, or the
motivation behind a particular behaviour, was
often very different from human infants.
SpecifIcally, the tests concluded that chimpanzee
gaze-following is a product of directional cueing
(related to predator identifIcation among other
things), and not of an awareness of internal
mental states (Povinelli and Giambrone, 2000).
The gaze-following experiments were
only a part of a wider group of tests that provide
compelling evidence for considerable differences
between chimpanzee and human cognition
(particularly thought processes behind tool use),
behaviour, anatomy, and evolution. Clearly then,
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previous studies have overemphasized the more
noticeable similarities. Again, Wylie (2002) is
proven correct when she argues that
considerations of differences are vital to the
formation of valid analogies, as are tests for
relevance. Povinelli and Giambrone (2000:72)
should be commended for showing that "[n]ot
only is our human way of thinking about the
relationship between our mental states and our
behaviour not completely accurate, there is a
significant chance that it is not the only game in
town". Thus, Povinelli and Giambrone (2000) do
not deny that chimpanzees have intelligence or
significant cognitive abilities, but rather that they
differ significantly from our own mental states
and preconceptions of intelligence.
Modern Foragers, Hominids, and Tubers
O'Connell et al. (2002) argue that meat-eating
did not play an important role in the evolution of
hominids during the PliocenefPleistocene
boundary. They use a variety of sources,
including archaeological evidence, changes in
skeletal morphology, geological evidence, and
some deductive reasoning to provide an
alternative hypothesis, yet they rest most of their
argument on ethnographic analogy. O'Connell
et. al. (2002) observed the Hadza, a modem
foraging people, and found that women, and
especially grandmothers, played a central role in
helping to provide food resources for the young.
The food resources they depend on are USOs, or
underground storage organs. These USOs are
tubers or root vegetables and they are an
excellent nutritional source when processed
properly through cooking (O'Connell et al.
2002). O'Connell et al. (2002) argue that this
'provisioning' pattern can be used as a model to
explain the changes in human anatomy and
behaviour from Herectus onwards. Specifically,
this subsistence pattern is thought to have had
several ripple effects, such as decline in adult
mortality, later age of maturation, increased
female fecundity, earlier weaning times, and a
variety of other modem human traits that we see
in the Hadza and in other groups (O'Connell et
al. 2002). In short, the modem Hadza subsistence
patterns, behaviours, and life-histories were used
as an analog for those of H erectus and later
species of Homo.
I have great difficulty with this use of
ethnographic analogy to aid in the reconstruction
of early hominid behaviour, subsistence, and life-
history. Contemporary Hadza culture is a product
of the recent past; it is not a carryover from our
African hominid origins. Even though O'Connell
et. al. found (questionable) correlates in the
archaeological and skeletal records that could
support their analogy, I believe that they failed to
establish the relevance of the connection. The
standard logic in such comparisons states that
since early hominids and more recent hunter-
gatherers use similar provisioning patterns, they
can be compared. Thus, the underlying
assumption here is that the Hadza are directly
comparable to our earliest ancestors. This
assumption fails for a number of reasons. For
one, variation in social behaviours and
provisioning strategies even among the Hadza is
considerable. Perhaps more importantly though,
this argument presupposes some form of cultural
and even biological stasis in assuming that
Hadza cultures have been unchanging over time.
In short, using ethnographic analogy
to reconstruct the behaviour of
prehistoric people is a hazardous
adventure that can easily lead to
interpretations that are little more than
projections of the images we have of the
ethnographic present onto earlier
populations (Gamble et. al., 2001: 186).
Cultures are dynamic (Ortner 1984), they are
constantly changing and reacting to internal and
external influences; they are not bounded
entities. While it is possible that H erectus may
have used USOs, their use likely occurred under
entirely different social contexts and subsistence
strategies. There is no empirical evidence, other
than the fact that both the early forms of Homo
and the Hadza forage for food, to suggest any
form of continuity. Furthermore, we have
changed considerably, physically and socially,
by any standard since the time of Homo erectus.
Finally, O'Connell et. al.'s argument requires the
controlled use of fire to render USOs digestible.
Yet, the controlled use of fire did not emerge
until a much later period than the one O'Connell
et. al. situate their argument (Boaz and Ciochon,
2001).
Structurally, O'Connell et. al.'s
argument fails due to a lack of relevance, a
failure to consider important differences, and
amplification. The Hadza and H.erectus may
share the similarity of a general foraging
strategy, but that is where the relationship ends
since O'Connell et. al. did not adequately
support their argument by analogy. Ultimately,
the conclusions reached by O'Connell et. al.
greatly exceed the strength of their premises.
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Gender and Race
During the late Enlightenment and into the early
20th Century, the "fact" that gender and race
were strongly analogous was fIrmly entrenched
in anthropology and other related fIelds (Stepan,
1990). The analogy stated that a "scientist could
use racial difference to explain gender
difference, and visa versa" (Stepan 1990: 39). In
other words, the comparison afftrmed that the
"lower races represented the 'female' type of the
human species, and females the 'lower race' of
gender" (Stepan, 1990: 40). For example,
women's lower brain weights and more
'primitive' brains were analogous to those of the
lower races, and so intellectual inferiority could
be explained via racial inferiority (Stepan, 1990).
As a result, women were considered in
evolutionary terms as more 'primitive' or
'conservative', while men were evolutionarily
'progressive' (Stepan, 1990). Once entrenched in
physical anthropology, this analogy soon
permeated many complex comparisons involving
physical, psychological, class, and national
categories (Stepan, 1990), to the great detriment
of women and other subalterns.
The gender/race analogy, which took
the form of 'man:woman::white:black', is
fraught with problems. To begin with, it suffers
from basic structural and relevance difftculties.
For instance, brain/skull size is proportional to
body size; factor into the equation that women
are smaller than men and we fmd that women
have larger brains, proportionally, than men do
(Stepan, 1990). As is the case with so many
analogies, these researchers relied more on
"expectations of the model" (Gould 1988: 132)
than on proper consideration of the data. The
structural problems with the analogy are a minor
issue when compared to the fact that this was a
case of culturally accepted metaphors (or
narratives) of gender and race inferiority
completely overpowering empirical evidentiary
constraints. I will use this analogy in the
following section to illustrate the relationship
between analogy and social metaphors and
narratives.
Social Metaphors and Analogy
The gender/race analogy is a powerful example
because it clearly illustrates that the choice of
analogy is neither neutral nor arbitrary. Facts
(data) are created as much as they are 'naturally'
present. With current 'facts' and academic trends
in physical anthropology, the gender/race
analogy would have been discarded immediately
after it was fust proposed. In the gender/race
analogy, long-standing European male
ethnocentric biases of racial and gender
superiority were given scientifIc weight through
empirical evidence (Stepan, 1990). It is
important to note that all the biometric evidence
gathered was real, to the extent that they were
accurate measurements. The important point is
that the choice of data was highly selective and
was conveniently used to serve and propagate
social biases. Again, this does not necessarily
imply a culture-free scientifIc alternative. My
point here is that there was a failure to consider
alternatives, to consider contradictory evidence.
There was no self-reflection, no consideration of
how the data was chosen. In short, "[A]nalogies
[become] 'naturalized' in the language of
science, and their metaphorical nature disguised"
(Stepan 1990: 42). As Stepan (1990) argues, the
analogy here became the science itself; without it
the scientifIc evidence was meaningless.
The gender/race analogy is valuable in
understanding the power of, and the risk inherent
in, the use of analogy because it illustrates how
social metaphors interplay with empirical
evidence. Analogy in theory or in practice makes
use of linguistic structures, concepts, and
groupings. It is nuanced and beyond simple
comparisons. It is truly a metaphorical exercise.
Naturally, culturally accepted metaphors will
work their way into analogies allegedly based
solely on empirical data. So, language is neither
neutral nor objective; it does not put us in
"correspondence with reality" (Jenkins 1995:
107). Richard Rorty (1991) argues that
metaphors are the best way to understand how
meaning is created and how it is attributed to
language. Social metaphors are in essence the
collection of beliefs in a society; they are our
great stories, our popular notions, and our
accepted wisdom. Landau (1991) uses the term
master-narrative when she describes the
underlying cultural biases at play in
paleoanthropological reconstructions of hominid
evolution. I believe that both Rorty and Landau
are correct; metaphor and narrative share a close
relationship. The space between the two is fluid
and dynamic, as seen in the gender/race analogy
where a dominant narrative of the time (the
superiority of Victorian culture) was used
metaphorically in evolutionary and social
comparisons of hierarchical relationships. For
Rorty (1991), metaphors are fluid; they change
as cultural acceptance of those metaphors
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changes. Consequently, the fleeting nature of
social metaphors should remind us of the
historical contingency of received wisdom; our
faith on current metaphors should not be held
fInn. As an extension, we should question
accepted analogies and metaphors in science and
not accept them easily as fact or truth; they are
cultural products as much as scientific ones and
they often run the risk of becoming ideology.
Emily Martin (1992), in her book The
Woman in the Body, explores anthropologically
how allegedly scientific analogies have their
metaphorical roots in a wider social context, and
ultimately, in ideology. One of Martin's best
examples of the link between social metaphors
and analogy is her historical review of the way
biomedicine has understood women's
reproductive systems and their monthly
menstruation. Historically, Western women were
considered to have reproductive systems that
were analogous to men's, except that they were
internalized, as opposed to externally visible
(Martin, 1992). This basic analogy stood for
hundreds of years, until new advances in 17th
century Britain (Martin, 1992). The explanation
for this external/internal difference arose from
the belief that since humans possess more 'heat'
than lower animals, and that humans were then
considered more perfect or advanced, the same
logic must hold true for men in relation to
women (Martin, 1992). Although the mechanism
of this analogy, heat, changed over time, the
belief that women were somehow deficient or
evolutionarily inferior remained (Martin, 1992).
By the 19th century a woman's menstruation was
considered to be pathological; Walter Heape, an
ardent anti-suffragist, held firm that menstruation
was something "hardly possible to heal
satisfactorily without the aid of surgical
treatment" (Lacqueur 1986: 32, cited in Martin
1992). The metaphors in medical textbooks, even
today, describe menstruation as a process of
disintegration, of death, and of expelling (Martin,
1992). As Martin (1992) argues, they convey
failure and dissolution.
The social effects of this male-centered
perception (or master-narrative) of the
functioning of women's bodies resulted in a set
of' scientific' tools that could be used to continue
to suppress the role of women in society.
Reminiscent of the gender/race analogy, the
science behind the 'heat analogy' of
humans:animals::men:women, with its flawed
'scientific' assumptions of evolutionary progress
and development, was supported entirely by
social metaphors narratives, specifically the
inferiority of women. In other words, the
humans:animals: :men:women metaphor already
existed in the minds of many; the analogy was
simply formalized through science. This analogy,
like that of the gender/race relationship,
contributed to sexism and the subordinate role of
women in society.
Many of the examples I presented
demonstrate that we approach each situation,
voluntarily or not, with particular theories and
presuppositions in mind. For example, the belief
in the scientific truth of the gender/race analogy
was unfounded, to give one example, because
there are no 'given' points of measurement on
the human body; thousands of variations and
points are possible (Stepan, 1990). Convenient
associations can and were easily constructed to
suit the desires of the researchers. The case
studies I presented demonstrate that the
comparison of cultures and the use of analogy is
inherently a cultural exercise in itself; one that is
"rooted in and shaped by the interests and belief
structures that constitute the context of the
researcher" (Wylie 2002: 154). How do we
choose what information to use? Why? Where is
the boundary between 'good science' and
cultural invention? Invariably, information is
omitted or ignored (Stepan, 1990). It is crucial to
remember that
[A] metaphor or analogy does not
directly present a preexisting nature but
instead helps "construct" that nature, the
metaphor generates data that confmn to
it, and accommodates data that are in
apparent contradiction to it, so that
nature is seen through the metaphor and
the metaphor part of the logic of science
itself(Stepan 1990,51).
Clearly then, Diderot was wrong in the literal
sense. Ideas are connected because we create
those connections, not because they reflect some
real or preexisting relationship. However, the
spirit of Diderot's comment that ideas awaken
one another is true, and it is here that analogy's
greatest asset can be found.
"The primary use of ethnographic parallels ... is
simple. It is to widen the horizons of the
interpreter" (Ucko, 1969: 262, cited in Parker-
Pearson, 1999: 21)
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Arguments for Analogy
Good analogies are possible, but they must be
relevant and empirically justified. Furthermore,
reflexivity and critical evaluation are crucial to
limiting structural errors and cultural biases. The
dangers are clear; analogies tend to fade easily
into fact or Truth, and are often taken literally, as
opposed to metaphorically. The effects of
'getting it wrong' or accepting received wisdom
are not always benign.
The benefits of analogy are multiple.
For one, analogy allows us to see similarities or
differences that were once unnoticed (Stepan
1990). Additionally, this 'discovery' aspect of
analogy allows us to gather new information via
empirical research (Stepan 1990). Analogy
allows us to expand our realm of possibilities, of
what we should expect and consider (Weiss-
Krejci 2001). This is echoed in Landau's (1991)
argument that our master-narratives have the
potential to create new hypotheses and avenues
of research because they are dynamic and fluid.
For archaeology and physical anthropology,
analogy can provide strong forms of interpretive
arguments, and more importantly, "strikingly
creative insight about the cultural past" (Wylie
2002, 152). Although often problematic and
flawed, non-human primate models are essential
in our understanding of human evolution because
they "permit the recognition of generally valid
principles that cannot be identified through the
study of a single species" (Martin 2002, 3).
Additionally, primate analogy helps to avert
narrow approaches to the study of human
evolution (Martin 2002). Analogy will never
offer certainty. No theoretical tool can. However,
it can be used to reduce error, assess likelihoods,
improve credibility of arguments, and diminish
uncertainty (Wylie 2002, 153). The following
case studies will better illustrate these beneficial
uses of analogy.
Consilience
Gamble et. al. (2001), in an article entitled "An
Integrative Approach to Mortuary Analysis:
Social and Symbolic Dimensions of Chumash
Burial Practices", deliberately set out to use
multiple lines of evidence to construct justifiable
interpretations of Chumash burial practices and
patterns to establish when Chumash chiefdoms
first appeared in the Santa Barbara Channel. The
study of mortuary rituals is inherently
problematic, there are countless ways that
archaeologists arrive at erroneous conclusions if
"they simply equate the distribution of artifacts
in cemeteries with social organization" (Gamble
et. al. 2001, 186). However, many studies have
shown that constructive information about social
relationships of the living can be gleaned from
the patterns of treatment of the dead (Gamble et.
al. 2001). The primary interpretive challenge for
archaeologists is the "arbitrary nature of
symbolic systems" (Gamble et. al. 2001, 186).
Moreover, without detailed ethnographic
information, there is "often no empirical basis for
deciding among several equally plausible
alternative social explanations of mortuary data"
(Gamble et. al. 2001, 186). Additionally, Anders
(1989) argues that we often describe cultures,
and I would also add the defmition of
civilization, through models implicitly based on
Western ideals or expectations. Facing these
daunting challenges, Gamble et. al. (2001)
approached the study of Chumash burial
practices from many angles. They incorporated
ethnographic analogy, bioarchaeological
evidence, and artifact analysis (Gamble et al.
200 I). Together, multiple lines of evidence, if
they consistently converge to a single
conclusion, greatly increase the strength of a
hypothesis while dramatically reducing the
validity of alternative explanations (Wylie 1993,
cited in Gamble et. al. 2001). This concept is
known as consilience, when multiple lines of
evidence "jump together" to arrive at one
conclusion (Gould 1989, 282). I will briefly
illustrate how Gamble et. al. (2001) used
ethnographic analogy in an appropriate way, as
opposed to the methodology used by O'Connell
et. al. (2002) discussed earlier in the paper.
The key to using ethnographic analogy
is to remain aware of its limitations. Useful
insights into a group's prehistory can be gathered
from well documented ethnographic sources
(Gamble et. al. 2001). Gamble et. al. (2001) used
ethnographic information of the Chumash
themselves, from the time of European contact,
to establish inferential links to earlier pre-contact
periods. In many ways, this is the ideal scenario
(Anders, 1989) given the unpredictable
variability of cross-cultural comparisons,
particularly in mortuary studies. These detailed
missionary statements allowed "identifications of
the material manifestations of social behaviour in
specific cultural context" (Gamble et. al. 2001,
186). Instead of directly relying on these
accounts and projecting them into the past,
Gamble et. al. (2001) took the ethnohistoric
accounts and generated hypotheses that could be
tested against the other lines of evidence.
rcn 'F,~\,1 \ ()!l '1,~(liH"':?II( l)
l.(Jpynght :~,~2.l1lJS T{ IT 1."-:\1":The L\,\:( ,ljc>urnal 01: .:\Ethr{)poJ(lV~·
Totem: The University of Western Ontario Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 13 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/totem/vol13/iss1/5
Specifically, one aspect of the mortuary analysis
was to compare archaeological evidence from
historic-period cemeteries to ethnographic and
ethnohistoric reports of Chumash social
organization and burial practices (Gamble et. al.
2001). This produced an "empirical basis for
understanding the culture-specific ways in
which, through symbolism of burial rituals,
historic-period Chum ash social relations are
reflected in the archaeological record" (Gamble
et. al. 2001, 195). This information, in
conjunction with other lines of evidence, could
then be used to understand earlier periods of
Chum ash history. Thus, they used ethnographic
accounts from a period after European contact as
analogs of potential behaviour for earlier periods.
This is a clear example of how analogy can be
used to create new ideas and gain insights into
the past. The hypotheses generated from the
ethnohistoric analogies were justified in that they
accounted for similarities, differences, and
relevance, in addition to corresponding to the
empirical record.
Although I fmd Gamble et. al.'s work
above par, I must also consider Galloway's
(1992) criticisms of ethnohistoric analogy.
Galloway questions the reliability and
contingency of historic accounts by colonial
imperialists in the New World. Clearly, there is a
form of 'double contingency' at work; in the bias
of the original records and in our use of them to
reconstruct the past. I would argue that this is not
structurally different in any significant way from
moving between modem ethnographies and
archaeological reconstructions of the past. No
ethnography, past or present, is free of cultural
bias and (mis)representation. However,
Galloway's point is well taken; most colonialists
had explicitly biased motivations that would
clearly not produce fair representations of
Indigenous cultures. Thus, we must be vigilant in
our awareness of the contingency of
representation, we must consider the authors
themselves, who they were, why they were
writing, and who they were writing for
(Galloway, 1992). In a sense, we must develop a
form of anthropological critique that mirrors
literary critique. In short, we must be highly
selective in our use of historic accounts.
Secondary Burials and European Dynasties
Secondary burials are a common form of burial
practice encountered in the archaeological
record. A secondary burial generally has two
phases: the original burial or treatment of the
body, followed by exhumation, secondary
preparation, and then a subsequent reburial, often
with many other individuals. I hasten to add that
this defmition serves simply to illustrate the
general form of secondary burials; specific
practices vary tremendously (Weiss-Krejci
200 I). One of the problems of interpreting
secondary burials is distinguishing what aspects
of the formation processes were culturally
created as opposed to environmentally produced
(Weiss-Krejci 2001). Weiss-Krejci (2001) argues
that analogy can be a useful tool to explore the
range of possibilities of formation processes, as
well as what caused them. The aim is to create
better understandings and interpretations of
secondary burials. Weiss-Krejci (2001) used the
secondary burial practices of the Babenburg and
Habsburg dynasties as analogs to Maya elite
burial practices. Weiss-Krejci's goal was not to
establish a direct connection between the two.
Rather, her goal was to explore how and why
those European dynasties performed secondary
burials and use that information as a window to
understand the contexts of elite secondary burials
in general, and potentially, Maya practices in
particular. The ultimate aim of her research was
to gather information on elite burial practices
that could then be tested empirically against
archaeological evidence from Maya sites. This
study was particularly valuable in that it
contained written accounts of Babenburg and
Habsburg burial practices, so motives and
meanings could be directly related to specific
practices (Weiss-Krejci, 2001). This is
significant in that written records, combined with
empirical evidence, greatly reduce the
uncertainty in understanding mortuary practices
(Flannery and Marcus 1996, cited in Gamble et.
al. 2001). This case study exemplifies how
analogy can be used to expand our knowledge
base and discover new relationships that might
have otherwise gone unnoticed.
Conclusion
I have shown that the use of analogy m
anthropology as a whole, and particularly in
archaeology and physical anthropology, is
unavoidable; it is part of every scientific (and
non-scientific or literary) practice. I have
demonstrated by example that a proper of use of
analogy is within reach (Gamble et. a!., 2001;
Weiss- Krejci, 2001), yet analogical arguments
often deteriorate into assumptions that are
founded on cultural metaphors/narratives
unrelated to the data (O'Connell et. ai, 2002;
Stepan, 1990; Sussman, 1999; Wylie, 2002).
These assumptions have sometimes masked the
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